I'm a PhD student in Economics at the University of Cambridge. My work involves testing microeconomic theory using experimental and observational data, and I currently focus on beliefs and preferences for information. I'm being supervised by Christopher Rauh and Julia Shvets. Here is my CV.

Information avoidance may be rational in a variety of settings. By allowing individuals to restrict their own access to information ahead of time, we reveal that information avoidance is often hindered by the temptation to consume information: almost 75% of individuals who want to avoid information are also willing to pay to eliminate it from their later choice set. When offered information, a small share of those classified as tempted by information make dynamically inconsistent choices. For the remainder, we show that it is possible to infer self-control costs by using data on response times: theoretically, response time increases in self-control costs for a resistible temptation. Using this strategy, we find novel evidence of commitment being motivated by sophistication about self-control costs, indicating that preferences for information are often dynamically inconsistent. We discuss implications for research on intrinsic preferences for information, strategic information avoidance, and markets for information.

We use field data on teenagers' memories of mathematics grades to provide novel evidence on the dynamic relationship between biased recall and beliefs. Recall of grades is strongly positively biased, and becomes more biased when more time has passed since the relevant report card, supporting theories of motivated beliefs and memory loss. Students are also more likely to overconfidently predict their next grade in periods where they recall an incorrectly high grade. We estimate a structural model which finds support for the two-way relationship between beliefs and recall proposed by Kőszegi et al. (2022). Beliefs about ability are sticky: a single bad quarterly grade in mathematics negatively affects academic self-esteem for 2--3 years. Our model also reveals substantial heterogeneity across students: high achievers have disproportionately strong preferences for positively biased recall, making their self-esteem much more resilient to unfavourable grades. Simulations suggest informational interventions can harm welfare and possibly widen attainment gaps if not coupled with measures to protect self-esteem, especially for low achievers.